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Problem area 
Current international regulations 
and policies do not consider the 
effect of an airborne safety net 
for the analysis of safety risks. 
This widely accepted practice 
tends to create significant 
tension between the realization 
of the ambitious safety 
improvement targets of SESAR 
and NEXTGEN, and the standing 
regulations. In order to close 
this gap between SESAR and 
NEXTGEN requirements, and 
standing regulation, there is 
need for a systematic 
development of safety risk 
analyses of airborne safety nets 
within the specific ATM context, 
which may range from current 
practices to advanced ATM 
concepts.  
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Objective 
The aim of the research 
described in this paper is to 
make a contribution through the 
systematic development of an 
unambiguous model of ACAS 
(Airborne Collision Avoidance 
System), together with its 
interactions with pilots and ATC.  
 
Description of work 
This paper presents the 
development of a mathematical 
model of ACAS operations. The 
specific modelling formalism 
used for this is Stochastically 
and Dynamically Coloured Petri 
Nets (SDCPN). The developed 
SDCPN model contains the 
technical, human and procedural 
elements of ACAS operations. 
The SDCPN model is 
demonstrated to work well for a 
historical en-route mid-air 
collision event. It is shown that 
the SDCPN representation is very 
powerful and allows the 
modeller to represent all 
elements of such a complex 
system (technical elements, 
pilots, ATCos, procedures in 
force), as well as interactions 
between them in a flexible and 
modular way. An illustrative 
example is shown presenting 
the possibilities of the 
developed model. 
 
Further work 
The ACAS SDCPN model is 
aimed to be used in follow-up 
research for the safety analysis 
of current and advanced ATM 
concepts including ACAS. A 
further step before application 
in risk/safety assessment is 
validation of the developed 
SDCPN based ACAS model. 
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Abstract - Current international regulations and policies do not 
consider the effect of an airborne safety net for the analysis of 
safety risks. This widely accepted practice tends to create 
significant tension between the realization of the ambitious safety 
improvement targets of SESAR and NEXTGEN, and the 
standing regulations. In order to close this gap between SESAR 
and NEXTGEN requirements, and standing regulation, there is 
need for a systematic development of safety risk analyses of 
airborne safety nets within the specific ATM context, which may 
range from current practices to advanced ATM concepts. The 
aim of the research described in this paper is to make a 
contribution through the systematic development of an 
unambiguous model of TCAS II version 7, together with its 
interactions with pilots and ATC. The specific modelling 
formalism used for this is Stochastically and Dynamically 
Coloured Petri Nets (SDCPN). The developed SDCPN model 
contains the technical, human and procedural elements of ACAS 
operations. The SDCPN model is demonstrated to work well for a 
historical en-route mid-air collision event. 
Keywords - ACAS, Petri Nets, Safety Risk Assessment, Safety 
Critical Systems 
I  INTRODUCTION  
Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) constitutes 
a world-wide accepted last-resort means of reducing the risk of 
mid-air collision (MAC) between aircraft [1]. Key elements of 
the current ACAS consist of TCAS II version 7 and procedures 
for pilots using this system. TCAS is intended to provide last-
minute collision avoidance guidance directly to the flight crew 
[2]. Hence, TCAS forms the last layer in the multi-layered 
defence against MAC, with all other layers typically belonging 
to ground based ATM. Although recent accidents (Überlingen, 
Germany, 2002; Amazon jungle, Brazil 2006) show that the 
current ACAS is not perfect, there are many more known 
examples where ACAS made a positive difference.  
Current ICAO risk/safety assessment policy is restrictive 
relative to ACAS in the sense that maximum values for mid-air 
collision risk are defined under the explicit assumption that the 
effect of an airborne safety net is not considered. This is also 
the case with Eurocontrol policy, which states that safety nets 
in general (both airborne and ground) should not be taken into 
account in the risk/safety assessment process [3, 4]. 
In view of the SESAR and NEXTGEN objectives of 
increasing both capacity and safety (advances in ATM may 
have significant impact on the effective performance of ACAS) 
there simply is a need to conduct safety risk analysis of new 
operations, including ACAS. And this need exists, even when 
the inclusion of ACAS in safety regulation would not be taken 
up. An example is the Airborne Separation Assurance System 
(ASAS) as one of the new concepts whose interaction with 
ACAS has proven to be important from both the procedural 
and the human factor aspects [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. These examples 
clearly show that the only way to include ACAS in the safety 
assessment process is through the modelling of ACAS 
operations.  
Modelling of ACAS operations has been the subject of 
research since the introduction of TCAS. Many different 
modelling approaches with different needs have since been 
identified. Several approaches have emerged for verification 
i.e. formal analysis of complex safety-critical systems such as 
TCAS: Finite State Machine approach [10], State Charts [11] 
and Hybrid Automata [12]. In order to understand human 
behaviour related to TCAS, Causal analysis [13], and Timed 
Knowledge-based modelling and analysis [14], are applied. 
Finally, the necessity to examine ACAS safety is followed by 
development of encounter models based on Fault Tree Analysis 
coupled with the Monte Carlo Simulation [15], and by Markov 
processes coupled with Bayesian networks [16, 17]. Apart from 
the mentioned models, an interactive simulator InCAS was 
developed [18, 19] in order to replay and analyse ACAS related 
incidents and to learn from encounters; and a tool called Replay 
Interface for TCAS Alerts (RITA) was developed for ACAS 
training of air traffic controllers and pilots [19]. 
The aim of the research described in this paper is to develop 
a model for risk/safety assessment of ACAS operations which 
would allow for the assessment of the benefit of ACAS in risk 
reduction in current and advanced ATM. In view of this 
objective, the specific modelling framework used in this 
research is the Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri 
Net (SDCPN) modelling formalism. The SDCPN formalism 
makes it possible to model a complex distributed operation in a 
systematic and compositional way [20], and at the same time 
brings powerful analysis frameworks within reach [21] and is 
fully embedded in the advanced safety risk assessment 
methodology TOPAZ [22, 23, 24].  
This research has been conducted with support from the RESET project commissioned by European Commission DG TREN under the FP6 Program. 
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This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the 
ACAS operation from the perspectives of the pilot and the air 
traffic controller (ATCo). Section III provides a description of 
TCAS II version 7. Next, Section IV explains the development 
of an ACAS model using the SDCPN formalism. This ACAS 
model covers TCAS II version 7 as well as the pilots, the 
controller, some other relevant equipment and the interactions 
between these model entities. Section V illustrates the 
behaviour of the new ACAS model in case of a historical 
MAC. Section VI draws conclusions.  
II DESCRIPTION OF ACAS OPERATION 
Since January 2005, ICAO mandates the use of ACAS 
worldwide for all aircraft with more than 19 passenger seats or 
with a maximum take-off weight exceeding 5,700 kg. TCAS II 
Version 7 is the only TCAS version that complies with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for ACAS [1, 
2, 11, 25]. TCAS is designed to work autonomously, i.e. 
without support of the aircraft navigation equipment, and 
independently of the ground systems used to provide Air 
Traffic Control (ATC) Services [25]. Generally, TCAS 
monitors the airspace around the own aircraft and warns pilots 
of the presence of other aircraft, so called intruders, which may 
present a MAC threat. A crucial part of TCAS is a Collision 
Avoidance Logic, the main functions of which are [25]: 
tracking, traffic advisory, threat detection, resolution advisory, 
TCAS/TCAS coordination, advisory annunciation and 
performance monitoring. In order to model an ACAS operation 
in this research, the operation is divided into the following 
phases [1, 11, 25]: 
A. Normal flight 
In nominal situations, i.e. during normal evolution of a 
flight, the aircraft crew receives instructions and clearances 
from the Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) and is flying according 
to them (manually or using the autopilot). Separation assurance 
is the responsibility of the ATCo. TCAS is constantly 
surveying the surrounding airspace, by broadcasting the 
interrogations and receiving replays from near-by aircraft. 
B. Appearance of Traffic Alert (TA) 
If an aircraft comes within the range of the own aircraft, 
and a collision is predicted to occur within the next 20 to 48 
seconds (depending on the altitude), a TA is issued, warning 
the flight crew by issuing the aural annunciation “Traffic, 
Traffic”. The mentioned aircraft is designated as “intruder”. 
Immediately, an icon representing the intruder aircraft on the 
Cockpit Display of Traffic Information (CDTI) changes its 
shape and colour and becomes a solid yellow circle. The crew 
responds to a TA by attempting to establish visual contact with 
the intruder aircraft as well as with other aircraft in the vicinity. 
The crew should not deviate from an assigned clearance given 
by the ATCo, and should continue to maintain or attain safe 
separation while reporting to the ATCo about the situation. 
C. Appearance of Resolution Advisory (RA) 
If the previous situation deteriorates, and a collision is 
predicted to occur within 15 to 35 seconds (depending on the 
altitude), an RA is issued. The previously mentioned “intruder” 
aircraft now becomes a “threat”. The RA includes an aural 
annunciation in the cockpit, being “Climb, Climb” or 
“Descend, Descend” (depending on the situation). An icon 
representing the threat aircraft on the CDTI changes its shape 
and colour and becomes a solid red square. In addition, the icon 
shows the appropriate vertical rate, which should be flown in 
order to resolve a conflict situation. A pilot receiving an RA 
should disengage the autopilot and manually control the aircraft 
to achieve the recommended vertical rate.  
If an RA occurs, the pilot flying should respond 
immediately by directing attention to the RA displays and 
manoeuvring as indicated, unless doing so will jeopardize the 
safe operation of the flight. By not responding to an RA, the 
flight crew takes responsibility for achieving safe separation. 
Even if an RA manoeuvre is inconsistent with the current ATC 
clearance, pilots are obligated to respond appropriately to the 
RA. Pilots are also required to report an RA occurrence, i.e. 
that they are responding to the RA, to the ATCo when 
appropriate, and to inform the ATCo of the RA deviation as 
soon as possible, using the defined phraseology. ATCos are 
advised to not issue control instructions that are contrary to the 
given RA. If an aircraft has begun a manoeuvre in response to 
an RA, the ATCo is not responsible for providing standard 
separation between that aircraft and other aircraft, airspace, 
terrain or obstructions.  
D. Return to normal flight 
When the RA is cleared, the flight crew get the aural 
annunciation “Clear of Conflict” (CoC). After that they should 
advise the ATCo that they are returning to their previously 
assigned clearance or should acknowledge any amended 
clearance issued, using the defined phraseology. After that, the 
pilot may engage the autopilot again. The ATCo resumes 
responsibility for standard separation if one of the following 
conditions is met: a) the responding aircraft has returned to its 
assigned altitude, the flight crew informs the ATCo that the 
collision avoidance manoeuvre has been completed and that 
standard separation has been re-established; or b) that the 
responding aircraft has executed an alternate clearance and that 
standard separation has been re-established. 
III CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF TCAS II VERSION 7  
As a prerequisite for developing an SDCPN model of the 
ACAS operation, first a conceptual model of TCAS II version 
7 is developed. The development of this conceptual model is 
largely based on [25]. The resulting conceptual model contains 
models of all algorithms used for threat detection and threat 
resolution, and would make it possible to conduct a simulation 
of any encounter scenario.  
A. Threat detection algorithms 
In order to determine whether a collision threat exists, i.e. 
to issue a TA or an RA, both the range and vertical criteria 
must be satisfied; i.e. if one of them is not satisfied, TCAS will 
not issue a TA or an RA. For checking whether the range and 
vertical criteria are satisfied, Range tests and Altitude tests are 
constantly performed during an encounter. Criteria used for 
making a decision about TA and RA issuance depend on the 
Sensitivity Level (SL) (Table 1). 
ISBN 978-1-4507-1468-6
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Table 1. Sensitivity level and threshold values [25] 
 (seconds) DMOD (Nm) ALIM (feet) Own altitude 
(feet) SL TA RA TA RA TA RA 
<1000 2 20 N/A* 0.30 N/A 850 N/A 
(1000-2350] 3 25 15 0.33 0.20 850 300 
(2350-5000] 4 30 20 0.48 0.35 850 300 
(5000-10000] 5 40 25 0.75 0.55 850 350 
(10000-20000] 6 45 30 1.00 0.80 850 400 
(20000-42000] 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 850 600 
> 42000 7 48 35 1.30 1.10 1200 700 
* NA – not available 
The Sensitivity Level (SL) depends of the aircraft altitude 
range. SL contains values for horizontal and vertical  
thresholds in case of TA or RA issuance, and dimensions for 
protected airspace (Distance Modification − DMOD and 
Altitude Limit − ALIM) which should be satisfied in case of 
slow closure encounters when  threshold values are not 
appropriate. During an encounter, if the horizontal or vertical  
is lower than the TA threshold or if the horizontal and vertical 
miss distance is lower than the TA DMOD and TA ALIM 
respectively, then a TA is annunciated. If the situation further 
worsens and  values are lower than the RA threshold or if the 
miss distances are lower than the RA DMOD and RA ALIM 
respectively, then an RA is annunciated [25]. 
For the purpose of range and altitude tests, aircraft are 
identified in a Cartesian coordinate system (Figure 1). Let xit 
and vit be the 3D position and 3D velocity of aircraft i given in 
expressions (1) and (2); the superscripts x and y refer to the axis 
system in Figure 1, and z stands for the altitude. Let θ it 
represent an orientation velocity vector vit in the horizontal 
plane (measured from the x axis in counter-clockwise direction, 
where 0  θ it  2) and let it represent the orientation of 
velocity vector vit in the vertical plane (measured from the 
horizontal plane up as positive and down as negative, where – 
/2   it  /2). 
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Figure 1. Velocity vector in Cartesian coordinate system 
Let xikt = xit – xkt be the distance in 3D space between own 
aircraft i and intruder aircraft k at time t and let vikt = vit – vkt be 
the relative velocity (closing speed) between the aircraft at time 
t.  
1) Range test: 
At each moment t, both the distance and the relative 
velocity between own and intruder aircraft in the horizontal 
plane are calculated. Knowledge about both values is required 
in order to calculate the “time to closest point of approach” (in 
horizontal direction, i.e. the range ).  
Let xih,t = (xix,t , xiy,t)T and vih,t= (vix,t , viy,t)T be the position 
and the velocity of aircraft i in the horizontal plane 
(respectively), and similarly for aircraft k. Let xikh,t = xih,t – xkh,t 
and vikh,t = vih,t – vkh,t be the horizontal distance and the relative 
velocity in the horizontal plane (respectively) between aircraft i 
and k at time t.  
Define ikh,t as the time to closest point of approach (CPA) 
in the horizontal plane between aircraft i and k at time t, which 
is given by the following expression:  
)cos(,    v
 x -
  
ik
t
ik
t
ik
th,
ik
th,ik
th ϕδ
τ
−⋅
=
  
(3) 
where iktδ is the bearing of the velocity difference vector 
satisfying 
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and iktϕ  is the bearing of the position difference vector 
satisfying 
)arctan(
,
,
ik
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ik
txik
t
x
x
=ϕ
 
  
 (5) 
Expression (3) is defined under the explicit condition that 
the denominator is not equal zero, i.e. if the following 
conditions are met: 
( ) ( ) 
	



 ≠∧−≠−∧≠− 02/2/
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ik
th
ik
t
ik
t
ik
t
ik
t vπϕδπϕδ
 
 
(6) 
2) Altitude test: 
At each moment t, both the vertical distance (separation) 
and the combined speed (vertical closing speed) between own 
and intruder aircraft are calculated. Knowledge about both 
values is required in order to calculate the “time to closest point 
of approach” (vertical ). Let xikz,t = xiz,t – xkz,t and vikz,t = viz,t – 
vkz,t be the vertical distance and the relative velocity in the 
vertical plane (respectively) between aircraft i and k at time t. 
Define ikz,t as the time to closest point of approach (CPA) 
in the vertical plane between aircraft i and k at time t, which is 
given by the following expression:  
( )iktziktziktz vx ,,, /−=τ  
  
         (7) 
Expression (7) is defined as long as vikz,t  0. 
vix,t 
viy,t 
viz,t 
vit 
vih,t 
θ it 
it 
x 
y 
z 
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3) TA or RA issuance 
The Range and Altitude tests compare given criteria (see 
Table 1) and calculated values for ikh,t, ikz,t,  xikh,t and xikz,t. So, 
whenever one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
( ) ( )00 iktz,ikth, <<∧<<     (8) 
or 
( ) ( )LIMAxMODDx iktz,ikth, <∧<
  (9) 
alerts shall be issued (TA or RA depending on the , DMOD 
and ALIM criteria given in Table 1). 
B. Threat resolution algorithm 
Once a threat is identified, a two-step process is followed to 
select the appropriate RA for the given encounter geometry. In 
the first step an appropriate sense is selected (upward or 
downward); that is, whether the aircraft needs to climb or to 
descend. In the second step an appropriate strength (vertical 
speed) is determined; that is, how rapidly the aircraft needs to 
change its altitude. 
1) Sense selection 
Let t be the moment at which an RA for own aircraft i is 
issued, i.e. RA seconds remain until CPA with intruder aircraft 
k. The TCAS Logic makes trials with upward and downward 
sense for own aircraft, in order to determine which sense 
provides the most vertical separation at CPA (time moment 
t+RA in Figure 2) under the assumption that intruder aircraft 
doesn’t change its flight profile. The sense which provides the 
greatest vertical separation shall be selected.  
 
Figure 2. RA sense selection (illustrative example) 
Consider a possible vertical position of aircraft i at moment 
t+RA during the trial (see Figure 2): 
• if the upward sense is selected  
RA
i
tz
i
tz
i
tz
i
tz vxupx RA ττ ⋅Δ++=+ )()( ,,,,
  
       (10) 
• if the current rate is maintained  
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i
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i
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i
tz vxcurrentx RA ττ ⋅+=+ ,,, )(
    
       (11) 
• if the downward sense is selected  
RA
i
tz
i
tz
i
tz
i
tz vxdownx RA ττ ⋅Δ−+=+ )()( ,,,,
   
       (12) 
where iz,t has a fixed value of 1500 feet/min [2, 11]. 
Two vertical separations at CPA between own aircraft i and 
intruder k, are recognized in the sense selection process and are 
given by the following expressions (see Figure 2): 
)()( ,, currentxupxa k tzi tz RARA ττ ++ −≡
 
        (13) 
)()( ,, currentxdownxb k tzi tz RARA ττ ++ −≡
 
 (14) 
The sense is represented by the binary variable cit which 
takes the following values: cit = 1 in case of the upward sense 
selected, cit = -1 in case of downward sense and cit = 0 
otherwise. In case aircraft i already receives a sense from 
aircraft k before it has finished its own sense calculations then 
c
i
t = -c
k
t , otherwise:  
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(15) 
The obtained sense for the own aircraft i is coordinated 
through the Mode S data link with intruder aircraft k with the 
aim to avoid that both aircraft select the same vertical sense. 
So, the RA sense sent to the intruder aircraft is represented by 
the calculated cit. 
2) Strength selection 
Once the sense has been selected, TCAS Logic will 
determine the RA strength. The RA Strength should be least 
disruptive to the existing flight path, while providing at least 
ALIMRA vertical separation between aircraft i and k at CPA 
(time moment t+RA), under the assumption that intruder 
aircraft doesn’t change the flight profile. That means that the 
change of vertical speed i*z,t should be minimal. The 
determination of the appropriate strength (vertical speed) 
should satisfy the following condition: 
if RA
ik
tz ALIMcurrentx RA ≥+ )(, τ  then no RA is issued,  
otherwise the strength is calculated as follows: 



=Δ−
=Δ+
=
1- c    ;v
1 c    ;v
v i
t
*i
tz,
 i
tz,
i
t
*i
tz,
 i
tz,* i
tz,
        (16) 
where: 
( ) ( )[ ] RARAi tzi tzRAk tzk tzRAi tz vxvxALIM τττ /,,,,*, ⋅+−⋅++=Δ
        
 
(17) 
 
t+RA 
i 
k 
a < ALIMRA 
b 
Upward 
Downward 
)(, currentxi tz RAτ+   xikz,t 
)(, upxi tz RAτ+  
)(, downxi tz RAτ+  
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3) Clear of Conflict annunciation 
The following conditions should be satisfied in order to 
announce CoC and terminate the encounter: a) RAs may 
terminate for a number of reasons: normally, when the conflict 
has been resolved and the threat is diverging in range [1, 11]; 
b) A CoC occurs after an encounter has been resolved [11]. 
Let tCPA be the moment when both aircraft are at CPA. Let 
t’ > tCPA be the first moment when both aircraft are safely 
passing the CPA and the following condition is satisfied: 
CPA
ik
th,
ik
t'h, xx >
   (18) 
then “Clear of Conflict” will be annunciated and the TCAS 
encounter is terminated.  
IV DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW ACAS MODEL USING 
SDCPN FORMALISM  
In this research, ACAS operations are modelled using the 
Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (SDCPN) 
formalism. The main reason for using SDCPN is the possibility 
of modelling complex relations existing between different 
system elements (humans, procedures, equipment) as well as 
the possibility to easily determining the causes or contributing 
factors of non-nominal system behaviour or accidents.  
Previous experiences using Petri Nets for safety analysis 
[26] as well as Dynamically Coloured Petri Net (DCPN) for 
aviation purposes [27, 28, 29] also support this choice. Once a 
proper ACAS model in terms of SDCPN formalism is 
developed, this can easily be incorporated in the modelling of 
an advanced ATM operation that also uses the SDCPN 
formalism. This way, a new ACAS model contains modules 
that can easily be added to some previously or future developed 
SDCPN modules related to current or advanced operational 
concepts. However, in this paper a new ACAS model is 
developed using SDCPN modules that work together as a 
standalone system.  
A. Hazard identification  
An important step in the TOPAZ methodology is a Hazard 
Identification. Once the operational concept has been 
sufficiently described, the hazards are identified. This is done 
in two steps [28]:  
a) Identification of entities (agents) and their functional 
relationships. The agents may be humans (pilots, air traffic 
controllers), technical systems (e.g. navigation equipment or 
cockpit display, etc.), or even more abstract entities (e.g. 
aircraft evolution); and  
b) Identification of hazards, both functional and non-
functional. Hazards are best identified using dedicated 
brainstorm sessions with a number of participants bringing 
complementary expertise [28].  
Because hazards could be taken from literature [2, 25] in 
this research no brainstorm sessions have been conducted. 
B. Specification of Local Petri Nets 
The SDCPN modules for the new ACAS model are 
developed at two hierarchical levels. The first level 
distinguishes the agents and the operation, where an agent is an 
entity that has situation awareness components. At the second 
level, the Local Petri Nets (LPNs) of each agent are described, 
where each LPN is a Petri net describing an agent-specific 
process. There may be connections between LPNs within the 
same agent or between different agents.  
A Stochastically and Dynamically Coloured Petri Net is, 
according to [20, 22, 23, 24] given by the following tuple: 
SDCPN = (P, T, A, N, S, C, V, W, G, D, F, I) 
where : 
P - is a set of places; T - is a set of transitions; A - is a set of 
arcs; N - is a node function, which maps each arc to an ordered 
pair of one transition and one place; S - is a set of colour types 
for the tokens occurring in the net; C - is a colour function, 
which maps each place to a colour type in S; V and W- is a set 
of place-specific colour functions, which describe what 
happens to the colour of a token while it resides in its place; G - 
is a set of Boolean-valued transition guards; D - is a set of 
transition delays; F - is a set of (probabilistic) firing functions 
describing the quantity and colours of the tokens produced by 
the transitions at their firing; I - is an initial marking, which 
defines the set of tokens initially present, i.e. it specifies in 
which places they initially reside, and the colours they initially 
have. 
The specification of an LPN implies determination of each 
element of the tuple for this LPN. 
C. Agents and Local Petri Nets for ACAS operation 
Each agent is represented by the multiple Local Petri Nets 
(LPN) mutually connected forming the SDCPN. Connections 
between LPNs are realised using the Compositional 
Specification principles presented in [20]. Five agents are 
recognized for the ACAS operation. They and their 
corresponding LPNs are given in Table 2. Interactions between 
agents and their corresponding LPNs are represented in Figure 
3. 
Table 2. Agents vs. LPN’s for TCAS II Version 7operation 
Agent LPN 
Own Aircraft 
 
Own aircraft state 
 
Own aircraft Mode S Link 
 
TCAS Processor 
 
TCAS Processor Working Mode 
 
CDTI Display 
 
CDTI Display Working Mode 
 
Aural Annunciation 
 
Aural Annunciation Working Mode 
Own Aircraft Crew  
 
Crew  
Intruder Aircraft 
 
Intruder aircraft state 
 
Intruder aircraft Mode S Link 
Air/ground Communication Link 
 
Air/ground Communication Link 
Tactical Air Traffic Controller (ATCo)  
 
ATCo 
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1) Own Aircraft as Agent 
This agent contains eight LPNs and represents a technical 
part of the Own aircraft TCAS system. LPN Own aircraft statei 
provides state information to LPN Own aircraft Mode S Linki 
which could be placed either in Work or Fail state. Through 
LPNs Own aircraft statei and Own aircraft Mode S Linki, the 
own aircraft and intruder aircraft positions are provided to LPN 
TCAS Processori which contains threat detection and threat 
resolution algorithms. LPN TCAS Processori can have one of 
the following three states (places): no conflict, conflict 
detection and conflict resolution. Whenever the LPN TCAS 
Processori is in conflict resolution state, it enables LPNs CDTIi 
and Aural Annunciationi to move into Active state, meaning 
they are audio/visually representing the selected RA. LPNs 
TCAS Processor Working Modei, CDTI Working Modei and 
Aural Annunciation Working Modei represent working modes 
of the corresponding LPNs. TCAS Own aircraft agent is 
represented in Figure 4. 
2) Intruder Aircraft as Agent 
This agent (Figure 5) contains two LPNs and represents a 
technical part of the Intruder aircraft TCAS system. LPN 
Intruder aircraft statek provides state information to LPN 
Intruder aircraft Mode Sk which could be placed either in Work 
or Fail state. 
 
G
D
Work 
Fail 
D
D 
State 
Conflict 
detection 
G 
G 
G G 
Conflict 
resolution 
No 
conflict 
D D 
D 
D D 
Work 
Fail 
Passive 
Active 
I 
I 
DD
Work 
Fail 
Passive 
Active 
I 
I 
D D 
Work 
Fail 
D D 
Crew is 
responsible 
ATCo is 
responsible 
D D 
Work 
Fail 
Own 
aircraft  
statei 
TCAS Processori 
TCAS 
Processor  
working modei 
CDTIi 
CDTI 
working 
modei 
Aural 
annunciati
on working 
modei 
Aural 
annunciationi 
Crewi 
Air/ground 
Communication 
link 
ATCo 
D 
State 
D 
G 
Fail 
Work 
D 
Own aircraft Mode S Linki Intruder aircraft Mode S Linkk 
Intruder 
aircraft  
statek 
AGENT Own aircraft AGENT Intruder aircraft 
AGENT ATCo 
AGENT Own aircraft crew 
Nominal 
I 
D 
I 
Passive Active 
AGENT Air/ground 
Communication link 
 
Figure 3. Interaction between agents and their corresponding LPNs for the 
ACAS operations 
3) Own Aircraft Crew as Agent 
This agent (Figure 6) contains one LPN and represents a 
key human entity in the ACAS operation. LPN Crewi contains 
three places in which the crew can be: a) Nominal - in which 
the crew is performing their usual tasks during the flight; b) 
Active – in which an RA is issued and the crew is following the 
RA, i.e. is taking proper action in time or with some delay in 
case they are too preoccupied to act immediately; and c) 
Passive – in which the crew is refusing to act according to the 
issued RA.  
 
D 
State 
G 
D 
Work 
Fail D 
Conflict 
detection 
G 
G 
G G 
Conflict 
resolution 
No 
conflict 
D 
D 
D 
Work 
Fail 
D D 
Passive 
Active 
I 
I 
Work 
Fail 
D D 
Passive 
Active 
I 
I 
Work 
Fail 
D D 
Own aircraft  
statei Own aircraft Mode S Linki 
TCAS Processori TCAS Processor  
working modei 
CDTIi 
CDTI 
working 
modei 
Aural 
annunciation 
working 
modei 
Aural  
annunciationi 
 
Figure 4. LPN contained in Agent Own Aircraft and their mutual relationship 
D 
State 
D 
G 
Fail 
Work 
D 
Intruder aircraft Mode S Linkk 
Intruder aircraft  
statek 
 
Figure 5. LPN contained in Agent Intruder Aircraft and their mutual 
relationship 
 
Nominal 
I 
D 
I 
Passive Active 
 
Figure 6. Agent Own Aircraft Crew 
4) Air/Ground Communication Link as Agent 
This agent (Figure 7) contains one LPN which represents a 
technical part of the system. This LPN presents working modes 
of the air/ground communication system.  
 
D D 
Work 
Fail 
 
Figure 7. Agent Air/Ground Communication Link 
5) Tactical Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) as Agent 
This agent (Figure 8) is represented by only one LPN 
representing a human part of the system: LPN ATCo could be 
in one of two places: a) Crew is responsible – in which an RA 
is issued and the ATCo is informed about it by the Crew and 
the ATCo is no longer responsible for separation assurance 
between the aircraft in conflict; b) ATCo is responsible – in 
which the ATCo is responsible for separation assurance 
between the aircraft, or the aircraft are not in the conflict or a 
TA is issued. 
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Figure 8. Agent Tactical Air Traffic Controller (ATCo) 
The procedures part of the TCAS II system is represented 
by enabling arcs between Agent Crew and Agent ATCo 
(Figure 3). Therefore, whenever LPN Crewi is in “Active” 
state, LPN ATCo switches to state “Crew is responsible”; LPN 
ATCo returns to state “ATCo is responsible” when an LPN 
Crewi is in “Passive” or “Nominal” state (of course under 
condition that LPN Air/Ground Communication Link is in 
“Work” state).  
V ILLUSTRATION OF THE MODEL APPLICATION 
A real life accident is taken for illustration of the developed 
SDCPN model of ACAS operations, namely, a collision 
between Inex Adria DC9 and British Airways Trident 3 which 
occurred on September 10, 1976 over VOR Zagreb (former 
Yugoslavia) at FL330 [30, 31]. TCAS was not in use at the 
time of collision. Figure 9 provides a schematic representation 
of the collision location as well as flight paths of both aircraft 
during the few minutes before the collision [30, 31].  
 
Figure 9. Schematic representation of the collision location and flight paths 
before collision (taken from [30]) 
According to the detailed vertical and horizontal situation in 
the last 32 seconds before collision [31] an encounter is 
reconstructed and input data for the simulation of the ACAS 
SDCPN are prepared (Table 3). Results of the ACAS SDCPN 
simulation are provided in Figures 10 and 11. If TCAS II 
would have existed at the time of the accidents, it could have 
prevented a collision by issuing a TA 73 sec, RA 86 sec and 
CoC 122 sec, from the beginning of the encounter.  
Estimated minimum horizontal and vertical separations at 
CPA are 0.08Nm and 1933ft respectively. Own aircraft would 
have received a Downward sense RA while Intruder aircraft 
would have received an Upward sense RA.  
Table 3. Encounter geometry (input) 
 
Own aircraft  
(DC9 - climbing) 
Intruder aircraft  
(Trident 3 - cruising) 
X coordinate 19.69 Nm 3.56 Nm 
Y coordinate 4.54 Nm 26.78 Nm 
Height 29620 ft 32960 ft 
Magnetic Heading 3530 115.50 
Ground Speed 465 kt 476 kt 
Vertical Speed 1670 fpm 0 fpm 
 
 
Figure 10. Horizontal situation of simulated encounter (Note: headings are not 
to scale) 
 
Figure 11. Vertical situation of simulated encounter (Note: rates of 
climb/descent are not to scale) 
VI CONCLUSION 
This paper presented the development of a mathematical 
model of ACAS operations using the SDCPN formalism. The 
motivation for the development of this ACAS SDCPN model is 
to use it in follow-up research for the safety analysis of current 
and advanced ATM concepts including ACAS. It was shown 
that the SDCPN representation is very powerful and allows the 
modeller to represent all elements of such a complex system 
(technical elements, pilots, ATCos, procedures in force), as 
  
D 
 
D 
 
ATCo is responsible 
  
Crew is responsible 
  
TA 
TA 
RA 
RA 
CoC 
CoC 
TA 
TA 
RA 
RA CoC 
CoC 
Trident  3 
DC9 
ISBN 978-1-4507-1468-6
  
 
 
 
  
NLR-TP-2010-327 
June 2010  12 
 
 
 
 
well as interactions between them in a flexible and modular 
way. An illustrative example was shown presenting the 
possibilities of the developed model. A further step before 
application in risk/safety assessment is validation of the 
developed SDCPN based ACAS model.  
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